Sinclair-Desgagné v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer)

On appeal from the Quebec Superior Court

Judgment released
September 18, 2026
Appeal heard
February 13, 2026
Citation
2026 SCC 31
Docket
42076
Disposition
Appeal allowed

Themes

Panel

In brief

By a 6–3 majority, the Supreme Court allows the appeal, finds that a serious administrative error by Elections Canada prevented a special ballot from being counted, and annuls the federal election held in Terrebonne on April 28, 2025, without costs.

Summary of the reasons

Reasons of Jamal J.

paras. 1–531

I. Introduction

paras. 1–8

The appeal concerns a Terrebonne election decided by one vote after Elections Canada used an incorrect postal code on some prepaid mail-ballot envelopes and failed to correct the error, leaving one ballot uncounted. The issue is whether this was an irregularity affecting the result under s. 524(1)(b) of the Canada Elections Act and, if so, whether the election should be annulled under s. 531(2). Applying Opitz, Jamal J. concludes that the three-part test is met: the error was a serious administrative error, it prevented a vote from being counted, and the affected vote equalled the victory margin. The election must therefore be annulled. The ruling is narrowly confined and does not make every electoral error grounds for a challenge.

II. Facts

paras. 9–12

Tatiana Auguste was declared elected for Terrebonne after the April 28, 2025 federal election and judicial recount, defeating Nathalie Sinclair-Desgagné by one vote. Elector Emmanuelle Bossé’s mail-in ballot was returned undelivered by Canada Post, despite timely mailing in Elections Canada’s prepaid envelope; she said, and the ballot confirmed, that she voted for Sinclair-Desgagné. An Elections Canada employee had mistakenly printed the wrong postal code on at least 40 return envelopes. He discovered the error on April 6 but neither reported it nor contacted affected electors. Sinclair-Desgagné applied under s. 524(1)(b) to annul the election, supported by another candidate; the electoral officials took no position on the merits.

III. Decision Under Appeal — Quebec Superior Court, 2025 QCCS 3859 (Dufour J.)

paras. 13–19

The Quebec Superior Court held that the incorrect postal code and the employee’s subsequent inaction were not an “irregularity” under s. 524(1)(b). Relying on Opitz, it interpreted that term as covering serious errors capable of undermining electoral integrity, but not inadvertent human errors lacking dishonest or malicious intent. The civic address was correct, the mistake was minor and inadvertent, and the employee reasonably believed ballots were being returned normally. The court also held that, even if an irregularity had affected the result, it would not annul the election. Bossé could have tracked her ballot, contacted Elections Canada, or voted in person, and Auguste had challenged three ballots during the recount. Given the serious and imperfect nature of a by-election, the application was dismissed without costs.

IV. Relevant Legislative Provisions

paras. 20–531

The relevant provisions include s. 3 of the Charter, guaranteeing citizens the right to vote; ss. 239(2) and 240 of the Canada Elections Act, requiring special ballots to reach the returning officer by the close of polling and placing responsibility for timely receipt on the elector; and ss. 286 and 301(2), governing ballot objections and recounts. Section 524(1)(b) permits an elector or candidate to contest an election for irregularities, fraud, or corrupt or illegal practices affecting its result, while s. 524(2) excludes recount grounds. Under s. 531(2), the court may annul an election when the grounds are established. Section 532(1) provides an appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada on law or fact.

V. Legal Framework

paras. 21–33

Section 524(1)(b) permits an elector or candidate to contest an election for irregularities, fraud, or corrupt or illegal practices affecting the result, and s. 531(2) permits annulment where those grounds are established. Because the Act does not define “irregularity,” its meaning and application are governed by Opitz. Although Opitz concerned allegedly ineligible voters, its majority recognized that the provision also applies when an election official’s irregularity improperly prevents an entitled person from voting. The provision must be interpreted using the modern approach, considering the statutory text, context, purpose, the constitutional right to vote, and competing democratic values.

A. The Right to Vote and the Purpose of the Canada Elections Act
paras. 24–26

Section 3 of the Charter broadly guarantees every citizen’s right to vote, a fundamental right that cannot be overridden under s. 33. The Court interprets it purposively as ensuring a meaningful opportunity to participate in choosing elected representatives. The Canada Elections Act gives effect to that right and must be read consistently with its purpose of enfranchising entitled voters and enabling their democratic choices. In construing s. 524(1)(b), the right to vote and that enfranchising purpose are central. They must nevertheless be reconciled with procedural safeguards that ensure only entitled persons vote and preserve electoral integrity and public confidence.

B. Text and Context of Section 524(1)(b)
para. 27

In Opitz, the majority interpreted “irregularities” in light of its neighbouring terms, “fraud or corrupt or illegal practices,” under the associated-words rule. Their common feature is serious conduct capable of affecting electoral integrity. Parliament therefore contemplated serious administrative mistakes, but not every error or deviation from statutory procedure qualifies. Non-compliance with legislation, standing alone, is insufficient to justify annulling an election.

C. Balancing Competing Democratic Values
para. 28

Opitz requires “irregularities” to be understood against competing democratic values, including the right to vote, accuracy, fairness, accessibility, finality, legitimacy, efficiency and cost. Because elections are administered by thousands of workers in difficult conditions, some imperfection is inevitable; the system seeks to enfranchise entitled voters as fully as possible, not perfection. The election-contest process must balance restoring reliable results against prompt finality and electoral stability. Annulment is therefore reserved for cases where an irregularity is proven to have affected the result and undermined electoral integrity.

D. The Substantive Approach to an Irregularity That Affected the Result and the Three-Step Test
paras. 29–33

Opitz adopted a substantive rather than procedural approach to s. 524(1)(b). A procedural breach does not automatically invalidate a vote; safeguards serve the underlying right to vote and are not ends in themselves. The applicant must prove each part of a three-step test on a balance of probabilities. First, there must be an irregularity: a serious administrative error capable of undermining the electoral process and directly bearing on a person’s right to vote. Second, it must have affected the result by allowing an ineligible person to vote or improperly preventing an entitled person from voting. Third, the court retains discretion under s. 531(2) to annul, guided by whether the votes cast doubt on the winner or the irregularity calls electoral integrity into question. Ballot secrecy prevents examining voters’ actual choices.

VI. Analysis

paras. 34–73
A. Standard of Review
paras. 34–35

This is a statutory appeal under s. 532, so appellate rather than judicial-review standards apply. Questions of law are reviewed for correctness; factual and mixed findings require a palpable and overriding error unless an extricable legal error is present. Discretionary decisions receive deference unless affected by legal error, a material factual misapprehension, or a failure to exercise discretion judicially. Jamal J. concludes that the Superior Court made errors of law at each stage of the Opitz framework, warranting intervention.

B. Step One: Was There an Irregularity?
paras. 36–47

An irregularity under s. 524(1)(b) need not involve breach of legislation. Opitz includes both breaches of provisions establishing entitlement to vote and serious administrative errors capable of undermining electoral integrity by directly affecting an individual’s right to vote. The Superior Court therefore erred in treating intentional, dishonest or bad-faith conduct as necessary. Opitz itself treated clerical mistakes as irregularities even without fraud or corruption. Although no specific statutory provision governed the mail-in procedure, the known postal-code mistake and Elections Canada’s failure to correct it for more than three weeks constituted a serious administrative error. Elections Canada had contact information for about 40 affected electors, could have arranged alternatives, and was expected to report the error. Its inaction prevented at least one vote from being counted.

C. Step Two: Did the Irregularity Affect the Result of the Election?
paras. 48–60

The second Opitz step concerns whether the irregularity changed the vote count, not whether it can be shown to have changed the electoral outcome through the voter’s preference. Bossé’s ballot was not delivered or counted because of the postal-code error and Elections Canada’s failure to remedy it, establishing the required causal link. The Superior Court erred by considering that Bossé voted for Sinclair-Desgagné, since ballot secrecy precludes investigating voters’ choices at any stage. Sections 239(2) and 240 place responsibility on electors for external contingencies, such as postal delays or late mailing, but do not relieve Elections Canada of errors within its control. Bossé followed the prescribed process and mailed her ballot 22 days before polling day; she was not required to verify official materials or correct Elections Canada’s mistake.

D. Step Three: Should the Election Be Annulled?
paras. 61–71

Under s. 531(2), annulment is discretionary, guided by whether the affected votes cast doubt on the winner and whether the irregularities undermine electoral integrity. The Opitz “magic number” test requires annulment where affected votes equal or exceed the victory margin; that test is met because one ballot was lost in an election won by one vote. The Superior Court erred in relying on three unresolved recount objections, which could not be revisited indirectly after the certified recount; on Bossé’s ability to track her ballot; and on alternative voting methods. Those considerations could not transfer responsibility for Elections Canada’s known, correctable error to the elector or make the contested-election regime unavailable whenever in-person voting remained possible. Although annulment is a serious remedy, the magic-number result left no discretion not to annul. The Terrebonne election must therefore be annulled.

E. This Decision Does Not Open Floodgates
para. 72

The ruling does not expose elections to challenges over every mistake. The relevant irregularity is narrowly defined: a serious Elections Canada error affecting an elector’s franchise, discovered in time to correct, recognized as requiring correction, but left uncorrected. Minor errors, promptly corrected errors, and errors not affecting the right to vote remain outside the approach. Applicants must still prove on a balance of probabilities that the irregularity affected the result, and courts retain residual discretion not to annul. The present combination—a confirmed lost ballot and a one-vote margin—is extremely rare.

F. Costs
para. 73

The Superior Court made no order for costs because the application raised issues of public importance and it would be unfair to make Sinclair-Desgagné pay. Jamal J. adopts the same approach in the Supreme Court, particularly because none of the candidates caused the error giving rise to the proceedings. No costs should be awarded in either court.

VII. Disposition

para. 74

Jamal J. would allow the appeal without costs and annul the federal election held in Terrebonne on April 28, 2025.

Reasons of Karakatsanis and Martin JJ.

paras. 75–239

I. Overview

paras. 75–85

The Canada Elections Act requires voters, including those using mail-in ballots, to comply with statutory requirements for their votes to count. Mail-in voting involves foreseeable risks at several stages, and the Act assigns electors sole responsibility for ensuring that their ballots are received on time at the proper location. Here, an Elections Canada worker mistyped the final three postal-code characters on one return envelope; the ballot was not delivered, and the voter neither tracked it nor voted in person. Under ss. 524(1)(b) and 531(2), an applicant must establish an irregularity, show that it affected the result, and satisfy the court that annulment is warranted. The error was limited, inadvertent and confined, and was neither serious nor capable of undermining electoral confidence. The appeal should therefore be dismissed.

II. Background

paras. 86–90

The appeal concerns an application to annul the April 28, 2025 federal election in Terrebonne because an Elections Canada worker mistakenly entered the wrong final three characters of the postal code on return envelopes for special ballots. The error was discovered on April 6 and partially corrected, but the supervisor was not told. The worker observed that envelopes were returning and that local ballot-return rates were comparable nationally. Ultimately, one voter was affected: her ballot was returned to sender, and she neither tracked it nor voted in person.

III. The Special Ballot and Mail-In Voting Process

paras. 91–239

Parliament expanded access to special ballots in 1993, making mail-in voting an accessible and flexible option, particularly for seniors and persons with disabilities. The process also creates risks because voting occurs away from polling stations, without election staff, through several administrators and the postal service. Safeguards include ballot tracking and the opportunity to vote in person if a ballot is not received. Sections 239(2) and 240(b) make the elector responsible for ensuring that the special ballot is received at the returning officer’s office before the deadline. The authors reject the view that this responsibility applies only to risks outside Elections Canada’s control: the statutory text assigns it to the elector regardless of whether an error originates with Elections Canada, the voter, Canada Post or another party.

IV. Challenging an Election Result

paras. 98–115

Sections 524(1)(b) and 531(2) establish a means of challenging an election for fraud, corruption, illegality or irregularities, as interpreted in Opitz v. Wrzesnewskyj. The authors apply Opitz and conclude that the postal-code mistake does not meet the high threshold for an irregularity. Their interpretation is informed by the purpose of the statutory scheme, the right to vote under s. 3 of the Charter and the text of s. 524(1)(b).

A. The Purpose of the Canada Elections Act and the Right to Vote
paras. 100–103

The Canada Elections Act seeks both to enfranchise eligible voters and to protect the integrity of the democratic process. It implements s. 3 of the Charter, whose positive and collective dimensions require meaningful participation, effective representation and electoral machinery capable of recording and implementing the people’s will. The Act balances values including accuracy, fairness, accessibility, legitimacy, efficiency and finality. Accordingly, s. 524(1)(b) cannot demand perfect certainty: protecting one person’s vote may conflict with the rights of all other electors. Courts must therefore interpret the provision with regard to the integrity of the electoral system as a whole.

B. Sections 524(1)(b) and 531(2) of the Canada Elections Act: The Framework to Contest an Election
paras. 104–115

Under Opitz, an election challenge proceeds in three distinct steps: proving an irregularity, fraud, corruption or illegality; proving that it affected the result; and, if both thresholds are met, deciding whether to annul the election. The issue here is whether incorrect postal codes on some special-ballot envelopes constitute an irregularity. Opitz identifies two categories: breaches of statutory procedures, and administrative errors that are both serious and capable of undermining electoral integrity. The first step concerns the nature and systemic impact of the conduct, not merely an individual’s right to vote; the latter is addressed at the second step. Simple, honest, isolated clerical errors do not meet the required gravity, which must be comparable to fraud, corruption or illegality. The impact inquiry asks whether public confidence in the legitimacy and finality of elections is undermined. A high threshold is necessary because elections involve extensive nationwide administration, and an unduly low one could disrupt results and disenfranchise many voters.

V. Application

paras. 116–127

The postal-code error was regrettable but did not meet the high threshold for an irregularity under s. 524(1)(b). It was neither a serious administrative error nor capable of undermining the integrity of the electoral system.

A. The Error Does Not Involve a Serious Mistake
paras. 117–124

The error was a minor, unintentional clerical mistake: the envelope had the correct recipient, street address, city, province and first three postal-code characters, with only the final three characters entered incorrectly. Although the worker failed to notify his supervisor or take further corrective measures, that omission did not elevate the mistake to conduct comparable to fraud, corruption or illegality. Mail-in voting’s risks are known and addressed through statutory safeguards, including the elector’s responsibility to ensure receipt. The affected voter could have used the tracking number and voted in person, but did neither. In the authors’ view, it would be inconsistent for the Act to assign that responsibility to the elector while permitting an election to be annulled for this kind of error.

B. The Error Is Not Capable of Undermining the Integrity of the Electoral System
paras. 125–127

An error affecting one vote was not capable of undermining electoral integrity. Elections Canada reported in 2013 that administrative rules were not followed in 1.3 percent of voting transactions, illustrating that some human error is inevitable. Mail-in voting adds procedural risks but provides tracking numbers and notices so electors can verify delivery, while ss. 239(2) and 240(b) place responsibility for receipt on them. This isolated error therefore could not undermine public confidence in the legitimacy and finality of elections, and the threshold for reopening the election was not met.

VI. Conclusion

paras. 128–129

The administrative error was not an irregularity under s. 524(1)(b). It was an unintentional minor mistake affecting one special-ballot voter, within a voting system designed for accessibility but carrying risks that the Act assigns the voter responsibility to mitigate. Annulment in these circumstances would not protect electoral integrity. Because the first stage was not established, the authors did not address the later stages and would dismiss the appeal.

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